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Abstract—In order to harvest the business potential of device-
to-device (D2D) communication, direct communication between
devices subscribed to different mobile operators should be sup-
ported. This would also support meeting requirements resulting
from D2D relevant scenarios, like vehicle-to-vehicle communi-
cation. In this paper, we propose to allocate the multi-operator
D2D communication over dedicated cellular spectral resources
contributed from both operators. Ideally, the operators should
negotiate about the amount of spectrum to contribute, without
revealing proprietary information to each other and/or to other
parties. One possible way to do that is to use the sequence of
operators’ best responses, i.e., the operators make offers about
the amount of spectrum to contribute using a sequential updating
procedure until reaching consensus. Besides spectrum allocation,
we need a mode selection scheme for the multi-operator D2D
users. We use a stochastic geometry framework to capture the
impact of mode selection on the distribution of D2D users and
assess the performance of the best response iteration algorithm.
With the performance metrics considered in the paper, we show
that the best response iteration has a unique Nash equilibrium
that can be reached from any initial strategy. In general,
asymmetric operators would contribute unequal amounts of
spectrum for multi-operator D2D communication. Provided that
the multi-operator D2D density is not negligible, we show that
both operators may experience significant performance gains as
compared to the scheme without spectrum sharing.
Index Terms—Co-primary spectrum sharing, Multi-operator
D2D communication, Sub-modular games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-device (D2D) communication refers to the sit-
uation where two user equipments bypass the cellular base
station (BS) and core network and establish a direct local
communication link. D2D communication has been introduced
as one of the highlights of 3GPP Release 12 [1]–[3]. It
offers several advantages, e.g., higher transmission rates due
to proximity, reduced battery consumption at the mobile
handsets, reuse and hop gain, etc. [4], [5]. Along with benefits,
D2D support brings also new challenges because the cellular
network needs to cope with new interference situations, e.g.,
cross-tier interference between cellular and D2D users [5].
In order to alleviate the interference problems introduced by
D2D, a great deal of mode selection and resource allocation
algorithms have been proposed, see for instance [6]–[8].
Unfortunately, almost all existing algorithms are applicable
to single-operator networks. However, without multi-operator
support, i.e., when the two ends in the D2D pair have subscrip-
tions with different mobile network operators (MNOs), the
business potential of commercial D2D communication would
be very limited.
The only available studies for multi-operator D2D can be
found in [9], [10]. Both patents designed protocols to setup
a D2D communication session considering different MNOs.
However, they are not seen to address how the spectrum is
allocated, which spectrum is used and how the communication
mode is selected. In this paper, we assume that multi-operator
D2D discovery has been handled, using for instance the
protocol in [9], and we propose algorithms for multi-operator
D2D spectrum allocation and mode selection.
D2D communication can be enabled either over licensed or
unlicensed spectrum. D2D communication in unlicensed bands
would suffer from unpredictable interference. Also it poses a
requirement for two wireless communication interfaces and
efficient power management at the D2D users [11]. Due to
these reasons, at this moment, licensed spectrum seems to be
the way forward to enable D2D communication, especially
considering safety related scenarios such as vehicle-to-vehicle
communication. In the cellular band, either dedicated spectrum
can be allocated to the D2D users (a.k.a. D2D overlay) or D2D
and cellular users can be allocated over the same resources
(a.k.a. D2D underlay). In a multi-operator D2D underlay,
cellular users may suffer from inter-operator interference, and
in order to resolve it, information exchange between the MNOs
might be needed. Due to the fact that MNOs may not be
willing to reveal proprietary information to the competitors,
we believe that, at a first stage, the overlay multi-operator
D2D scheme would be easier to implement.
In this paper, we consider a scenario with two MNOs and
we identify how much spectrum each MNO should commit for
overlay multi-operator D2D communication. The MNOs need
not contribute equal amount of spectrum as they may have
different network utilities and loads. We formulate a game
where the MNOs make offers about the amount of spectrum
they want to contribute and use a sequential best response to
each other. The MNOs neither need to exchange proprietary
information nor to communicate with an external party. Also,
they are not forced to take any action. If one party does
not experience performance gain as compared to no sharing,
the agreement can break and the communication among the
devices is routed to the cellular infrastructure.
Besides spectrum allocation, the MNOs also need to agree
about the mode selection scheme for the multi-operator D2D
users. In principle, existing schemes for single-operator net-
Fig. 1. User equipments registered to different MNOs communicating in a
D2D manner.
works enabling D2D communication can be used. We consider
the algorithm proposed in [8] where D2D communication
mode is used only if the measured interference in the part
of the cellular spectrum dedicated for D2D communication
is low. We extend this algorithm to a multi-operator setting.
Given the mode selection scheme, we allocate spectrum for
multi-operator D2D users for maximizing the D2D user rate
while also meeting MNO-specific user rate constraints. Under
these conditions, it turns out that the formulated game is
concave, satisfies the dominance solvability condition, and is
also sub-modular. As a result, one can prove that the best
response optimization converges monotonously to the unique
Nash equilibrium (NE) from any initial point.
Using the proposed scheme we illustrate that both MNOs
may experience significant performance gains as compared to
no sharing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work which uses a non-cooperative game theoretical model for
spectrum allocation for multi-operator D2D communication.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider two MNOs, i = {1, 2}, enabling D2D com-
munication. For the i-th operator, the BSs are distributed
according to a Poisson point process (PPP) with density λbi
and, the cellular users are distributed according to a PPP with
density λci . The distributions of BSs and cellular users are
independent. A cellular user is associated with the nearest
home-operator BS. An MNO has two types of D2D users:
intra-operator D2D users, i.e., when the two ends in the
D2D pair have subscriptions with the same MNO, and multi-
operator D2D users. The locations of intra-operator D2D
transmitters follow a PPP with density λdi and the locations of
multi-operator D2D transmitters follow a PPP with density λ.
For the multi-operator D2D pairs, we assume that the densities
of transmitters from different MNOs are equal, i.e., λ/2. As
a result, for the i-th MNO, the ratio of multi-operator D2D to
intra-operator D2D transmitters is wi=λ/(λ+ 2λdi ).
Figure 1 illustrates the D2D concept towards a multi-
operator scenario. Devices registered to different MNOs can
communicate in a D2D manner or in infrastructure mode via
the nearby serving BSs. The spectrum controller is an entity to
coordinate the agreement about spectrum allocation and mode
selection between the peer networks.
Figure 2 shows the spectrum allocation for the MNOs in
Fig. 2. Spectrum divisions for the MNOs.
case they employ the overlay principle also for intra-operator
D2D communication. A fraction βci of the MNO’s spectrum
is dedicated for cellular communication and a fraction βdi is
dedicated for intra-operator D2D communication. Finally, an
MNO contributes a fraction βi of spectrum to the shared band,∑
i βi, where multi-operator D2D communication takes place.
Obviously, βdi +βci +βi = 1, ∀i. D2D users selecting cellular
transmission mode would be allocated to the βci part of the
spectrum. While in our analysis we assume FDD MNOs that
contribute frequency resources for D2D communication, the
same analysis is applicable to TDD MNOs that contribute
time-frequency resource blocks. In the TDD case, multi-
operator D2D support poses a requirement for time synchro-
nization between the MNOs which is more challenging.
In order to describe the quality-of-service offered to the
D2D users, we assume that an MNO maintains a network
utility function that is equal to the average D2D rate
Ui = (1− wi)Qdi + wiQsi , i={1, 2} (1)
where Qdi is the average normalized rate for intra-operator
D2D users and Qsi describes the same quantity for multi-
operator D2D users. Also, an MNO must offer to its cellular
users an average rate equal to a target rate, i.e., Qci =τi.
The average rate of cellular users, Qci , can be obtained
by scaling their average spectral efficiency, Rci , with the
normalized bandwidth available for cellular transmissions, βci .
On the other hand, the D2D users may operate either in
cellular or in D2D mode. Let us denote by qdi the fraction
of intra-operator D2D users selecting D2D mode and by q the
same quantity for multi-operator D2D users. The average rate
for intra-operator D2D users, Qdi , should be computed as an
average of their average spectral efficiencies in cellular mode,
Rci , and D2D mode, Rdi , scaled with the appropriate fractions
of user density and cellular bandwidth. The average rate for
multi-operator D2D users, Qsi , should be obtained in a similar
manner. To sum up,
Qci = β
c
i R
c
i
Qdi = β
c
i R
c
i (1 − qdi ) + βdi Rdi qdi
Qsi = β
c
i R
c
i (1 − q) + β R q
(2)
where R is the average spectral efficiency for multi-operator
D2D users selecting D2D mode. The average spectral efficien-
cies for cellular and D2D users can be calculated as in [6]
Rci = νi
∫∞
0
Pci
1+γ dγ
Rdi =
∫∞
0
Pdi
1+γ dγ
R =
∫∞
0
P
1+γ dγ
(3)
where γ is the SINR, P is the coverage probability for multi-
operator D2D users in D2D mode, i.e., the probability that
the SINR at a typical multi-operator D2D user is larger than
the SINR γ, Pdi describes the same quantity for intra-operator
D2D users, Pci is the coverage probability for cellular users
and νi is the portion of time a user in cellular mode is active.
The coverage probability depends on the interference level
at the user. The density of interferers can be computed only
after the mode selection scheme is specified. There are many
schemes available in the literature, e.g., based on the D2D pair
distance [6] and/or the distance between the D2D transmitter
and cellular BS [7]. In these cases, D2D pairs can be arbitrarily
close to each other. In order to avoid that, in [8], it is proposed
to select the mode based on the measured interference at the
D2D transmitter. When the measured interference is below
a threshold, there is indication there are few ongoing D2D
communication pairs. Provided that the D2D pair distance d
is small, low interference at the D2D transmitter necessitates
low interference at the D2D receiver.
It is straightforward to extend the mode selection algorithm
described in [8] in a multi-operator setting. The D2D transmit-
ter measures the interference over the shared band,
∑
i βi, and
communicates a quantized version of it to its home BS. The
BS decides about the mode using the same threshold-based
test and communicates its decision back to the transmitter.
In this paper, the measurement is assumed to be done at the
D2D transmitter in order to simplify the mathematical analysis
of outage probability but practical implementation could be
based on measurements conducted by the D2D receiver. In
that case, the mode would be selected at the home operator of
the receiver. As long as the D2D pair distance d is short, we
do not expect significant differences in the results.
In [8], it is shown that the locations of D2D transmitters
selecting D2D communication mode follow a Matérn-hardcore
point process (MPP) type II with hardcore distance δ. Using
the properties of MPP type II, the hardcore distance can be
mapped to the mode selection threshold, ǫ, using simplified
methods as in [12]. Finally, the coverage probability for multi-
operator D2D users in the presence of Rayleigh fading can be
computed using a similar approach as in [8]
P=e
−
γσ2β
Ptl(d)
−qλ
2pi∫
0
∞∫
2δ
f(r)r
1+f(r) drdφ−cqλ
2pi∫
0
2δ∫
δ
f(r)r
1+f(r) drdφ (4)
where β = β1+β2, Pt is the D2D transmit power level, σ2
is the noise level calculated over the full cellular band, c =
2π(4π/3+
√
3/2)−1, l(·) is the distance-based pathloss and
f(r)=γ l(
√
r2+d2−2rd cosφ)/l(d).
The coverage probability for intra-operator D2D users can
be expressed in a form similar to equation (4) after replacing q
by qdi , λ by λdi and β by βdi . Finally, the coverage probability
for the cellular uplink has been derived in [8]. If a power law
model for the distance-based pathloss is used, with pathloss
exponent a, the coverage probability can be written as
Pci =
(
1+αi
2γ
a−2 2F1
(
1, a−2
a
, 2− 2
a
,−γ))−1 (5)
where αi is the probability a BS is active and 2F1 is the Gaus-
sian hypergeometric function. Note that the activity probability
αi should take into account not only the densities of cellular
users but also the densities of intra-operator D2D and multi-
operator D2D users selecting cellular communication mode,
i.e., (1− qdi )λdi and (1 − q)λ/2 respectively.
III. MULTI-OPERATOR D2D SPECTRUM SHARING GAME
We consider a strategic non-cooperative spectrum sharing
game between two MNOs, G = (I,S,U), where I is the set
of MNOs, S=S1×S2 is the set of the joint strategies and U=
[U1, U2] is the vector of utility functions. The strategy space
for an MNO represents the spectrum fraction contributed for
the shared band, i.e., Si={βi : 0 ≤ βi ≤ ui}, i={1, 2}. The
upper limit of the strategy space, ui, depends on the MNO-
specific constraints which are presented below.
In this paper, we assume that the mode selection threshold,
ǫd, for the spectrum band dedicated to intra-operator D2D has
been decided by each MNO, and the mode selection threshold,
ǫ, for the shared band dedicated to multi-operator D2D has
been agreed between the MNOs or imposed by the regulator.
Note that given the decision thresholds, ǫd and ǫ, an MNO is
able to compute the densities of intra-operator D2D and multi-
operator D2D users selecting cellular communication mode.
In a non-cooperative game, each player sets its strategy
profile to maximize its own utility function. For the game in
question, an MNO maximizes the average D2D user rate, see
equation (1), under operator-specific constraints for cellular
users and intra-operator D2D users. For instance, the average
cellular user rate should be equal to a target rate, Qci = τi,
and the intra-operator D2D rate should be higher than a
constraint, βdi Rdi ≥ µdi . We assume that without spectrum
sharing, i.e, βi=0, these constraints are satisfied. To sum up,
an MNO will identify the amount of spectrum to contribute
for multi-operator D2D communication, βi, as the solution of
the following optimization problem.
Maximize :
βi≥0
Ui. (6a)
Subject to : Qci = τi (6b)
βdi R
d
i ≥ µdi . (6c)
Since the inter-operator spectrum sharing game should be
distributed and non-cooperative, one possible way to reach
to a consensus is the best response iteration. According to
it, given the opponent’s proposal βj , the i-th MNO identifies
its contribution βi for maximizing Ui. In order to identify the
optimal spectrum fraction βi we use the following steps: Given
the thresholds ǫdi and ǫ, the i-th MNO computes the fractions
of intra-operator D2D and multi-operator D2D users in cellular
communication mode, i.e., (1−qdi )λdi and (1−q)λ/2 respec-
tively, thus able to identify the required amount of spectrum
for cellular users, βci , based on the equality constraint (6b).
Then, the spectrum fractions, βi and βdi , can be related as
βi=1−βci−βdi . In the Appendix, we show that the utility and
the left-hand side of the constraint in (6c) are both concave in
βi. If there is always a βi such that the constraint in (6c) is
strictly satisfied, the first-order conditions are both necessary
and sufficient. As a result, the optimal βi can be identified
using standard convex optimization tools at a low complexity.
In a non-cooperative game, some of the most important
questions are the existence and uniqueness of the NE. In case
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Fig. 3. Example convergence to the unique NE for symmetric operators,
when the mode selection threshold in the shared band is ǫ=−72 dBm and
in the intra-operator D2D band is ǫd
i
=−75 dBm for both MNOs.
there are multiple Nash equilibria, the selected equilibrium
would depend on the initial strategy profile [13], [14]. This
property might be undesirable because the performance of an
MNO would depend on the selection order between the MNOs
and also on their initial proposals for spectrum contribution in
the shared band.
Proposition 1. The formulated game has a unique NE and the
best response iteration converges to it from any initial point.
Proof: According to [14, Theorem 1], a NE exists for a
concave game. In [15, Theorem 4.1], the dominance solvability
condition under which a concave game has a unique NE and
the best response iteration converges to it from any initial
point is proposed. In the Appendix, we prove that the game is
concave and the utility function Ui subjecting to MNO-specific
constraints satisfies the dominance solvability condition.
Proposition 2. Using the best response iteration, the MNOs
converge monotonously to the NE.
Proof: According to [13, Algorithm I], the best response
algorithm converges monotonically to a NE, from any initial
strategy profile, if the utility Ui is sub-modular function
and the strategy space satisfies the descending property. The
monotonicity would be in the opposite direction for the MNOs.
According to [16], the function Ui is sub-modular in the
strategy set of the two players if the first-order cross derivative
is negative. Following an approach similar to the one followed
in equations (7) and (8), one can show that ∂2Ui
∂βi∂βj
< 0.
Also, due to the fact that the strategy space does not depend
on the opponent behavior, but only on the operator-specific
constraints, the descending property is satisfied.
After the best response converges, it is natural to assume that
the agreement will break if the utility of an MNO is lower than
the utility corresponding to no spectrum sharing, Ui<U0,i.
In general, the MNOs may have different network utility
functions and constraints. Because of that, the best response
iteration cannot be used to infer information about the network
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Fig. 4. Spectrum fractions, βi, for multi-operator D2D w.r.t the mode
selection threshold in the shared band. λd
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=1, λd
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=0.8. The mode selection
threshold in the intra-operator D2D band is ǫd
i
=−75 dBm for both MNOs.
state of the opponent MNO.
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
We consider two MNOs with BS density λbi =
1/(π 2002), i={1, 2}, cellular user density λci = λbi and multi-
operator D2D density, λ=4λbi . We evaluate the performance
of the spectrum allocation scheme for different intra-operator
D2D densities. We fix λd1 = λbi and we vary λd2. We take
3GPP propagation environment [18] into account with pathloss
equation in dB: 37.6 log10(r) + 15.3 for the cellular mode
and, 40.0 log10(r)+ 28 for the D2D mode, where r is the
distance in meters. The D2D link distance is fixed to d=30
m. We use fixed transmit power levels equal to 23 dBm for the
cellular mode and 20 dBm for the D2D mode. The normalized
target rates for intra-operator D2D users and cellular users are
τi= µ
d
i =0.3, i={1, 2}.
Figure 3 shows an example convergence of the best response
iteration to the unique NE for λd1 = λd2. If the MNOs are
symmetric, they should contribute equal amounts of spectrum
in the shared band. The initial strategy profiles are randomly
selected. The MNO 1 first solves the optimization problem (6)
assuming that the MNO 2 does not contribute any spectrum
in the shared band. Then, the MNO 2 optimizes for β2 given
that the MNO 1 contributes spectrum fraction β1 =0.24 and
so forth. According to Proposition 2, one operator converges
monotonously increasing and the other monotonously decreas-
ing to the NE.
Next, we make the operators non-symmetric assuming that
the MNO 2 has less intra-operator D2D users, λd2 = 0.8. In
Figure 4, we depict the spectrum fractions contributed by the
MNOs with respect to the mode selection threshold in the
shared band. In general, asymmetric MNOs would contribute
unequal amounts of spectrum. In our example, the MNO 2
has less network load than MNO 1 and, because of that, it has
the capacity to contribute more spectrum in the shared band.
Also, one can point out that a low mode selection threshold
results in more users in cellular communication mode and thus,
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Fig. 5. Performance gain for the MNOs as compared to the case without
spectrum sharing. λd
1
= 1, λd
2
= 0.8, The mode selection threshold in the
intra-operator D2D band is ǫd
i
=−75 dBm for both MNOs.
more spectrum resources should be reserved by the MNOs to
meet their cellular user rate constraints. As the mode selec-
tion threshold increases, the associated bandwidth for multi-
operator D2D support increases too. However, increasing the
mode selection threshold beyond certain point has adverse
effects, since the increased self-interference among the multi-
operator D2D pairs starts reducing their rate performance.
Figure 5 shows the sum rate gain for the MNOs as compared
to the case without multi-operator D2D support, i.e., all
multi-operator transmissions are routed through the BSs. Both
MNOs experience performance gain. The MNO 2 that has less
network load contributes the higher fraction of spectrum in the
shared band, see Figure 4. Because of that, the MNO 1 enjoys
more benefit from spectrum sharing than the MNO 2.
Finally, we fix the mode selection threshold in the shared
band, ǫ = −72 dBm, and assess the performance gains for
varying density of D2D users for the MNO 2. In Figure 6,
one can see that symmetric MNOs achieve around 50 % gain.
For densities λd2>1.2, the MNO 2 does not have the capacity
to contribute any spectrum, however, the MNO 1 still benefits
by contributing a fraction β1 = 0.24. In that case, the MNO
1 experiences 20% gain due to the proximity between multi-
operator D2D users, while the gain for the MNO 2 is attributed
to both proximity and spectrum sharing. The performance gain
for both MNOs is high, i.e., close to 100%, only if the network
load for the MNO 2 becomes low. In that case, the MNO 2 is
able to contribute a high bandwidth fraction β2=0.52, while
for the MNO 1, β1=0.08.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a method for spectrum allocation
for D2D communication considering different mobile network
operators. In a multi-operator D2D setting, the operators may
not be willing to reveal proprietary information to the competi-
tor and/or to other parties. Because of that, we modeled their
interaction as a non-cooperative game. An operator makes an
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
Intra−operator D2D user density, λ2
d
G
ai
n
 
 
Operator 1
Operator 2
Fig. 6. Performance gain for the MNOs as compared to the case without
spectrum sharing for varying density of D2D users for the MNO 2. λd
1
=1.
The mode selection threshold in the shared band is ǫ=−72 dBm and in the
intra-operator D2D band is ǫd
i
=−75 dBm for both MNOs.
offer about the amount of spectrum to contribute for multi-
operator D2D communication considering only its individual
performance. While making the offer, it also takes into account
the offer made by the opponent operator. With the performance
metrics considered in the paper, we showed that the formulated
game has a unique NE and the sequence of operators’ best
responses converges to it from any initial point. In general,
asymmetric operators contribute unequal amount of spectrum.
An operator may not contribute any spectrum at all but still,
the opponent may have the incentive to be cooperative due
to the D2D proximity gain. Provided that the multi-operator
D2D density is not negligible, we showed that both operators
may experience significant performance gains. The particular
gain would depend on the operator-specific network load,
utility and design constraints. As potential directions for future
work, one may consider spectrum sharing for more than
two MNOs enabling multi-operator D2D communication. One
could study whether it is beneficial to construct a common
pool of spectral resources or to realize multi-operator D2D by
means of bilateral agreements between operators.
APPENDIX
First, we show that the utility Ui is concave in βi by
computing its second derivative
∂2Ui
∂βi
2 = (1− wi)∂
2Qdi
∂βi
2 + wi
∂2Qsi
∂βi
2
=
(1−wi)q
d
i
η
∞∫
0
e
−
γβdi
η
−C(γ,qdi )
1+γ
(
βdi γ
η
−2
)
γdγ
+wiq
η
∞∫
0
e
−
γ(βi+βj)
η
−C(γ,q)
1+γ
(
(βi+βj)γ
η
−2
)
γdγ
(7)
where C(γ, q) = qλ
2pi∫
0
∞∫
2δ
f(r)r
1+f(r)drdφ + cqλ
2pi∫
0
2δ∫
δ
f(r)r
1+f(r)drdφ,
C(γ, qdi ) can be expressed in a similar manner and η=
Ptl(d)
σ2
.
The first part of the right-hand side of the equation (7) can
be treated as follow∫ ∞
0
e
−
γβdi
η
−C(γ,qdi )
1+γ
(
βdi γ
η
− 2
)
γdγ
(p1)
≤
∫ ∞
0
e
−
γβdi
η
1+γ
(
βdi γ
η
− 2
)
γdγ
(p2)
= − ρ+1
ρ
+ (ρ+ 2)eρ1E1(ρ)
(p3)
< − ρ+1
ρ
+ (ρ+ 2)
(
1
ρ+
1
1+
1
ρ
)
= 0,
(8)
where ρ= β
d
i
η
, inequality (p1) holds true due to C(γ, qdi )>0
and equality (p2) uses that ∫∞0 e−ρx1+x (ρx− 2)x dx=− ρ+1ρ +
(ρ + 2)eρE1(ρ) where E1(ρ)=
∫∞
ρ
e−γ
γ
dγ is the exponential
integral. For ρ>0, there is a continued fraction form expressed
as E1(ρ)=e
−ρ
(
1
ρ+
1
1+
1
ρ+
2
1+ · · ·
)
from [17, 5.1.22]. This
continued fraction form is less than e−ρ
(
1
ρ+
1
1+
1
ρ
)
. From
this relation, inequality (p3) holds true.
In a similar manner one can show that the second term
of the right-hand side of equation (7) is also negative. That
completes the proof that the utility Ui is concave. Also, the
utility Ui is continuous in βj . The constraint (6b) just affects
the upper limit of strategy space while the left-hand side of the
constraint in (6c) is concave in βi. That completes the proof
that the game in question is concave.
The Lagrangian function of the optimization problem (6) is
Li = Ui+ νi(β
c
iR
c
i − τci )+ ξi(βdi Rdi −µdi ), where νi ≥ 0 and
ξi ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers. Then, the convergence
of the best response to the unique NE can be proved by the
diagonal dominance solvability condition of the Lagrangian.∣∣∣∂2Li
∂β2i
∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣ ∂2Li∂βi∂βj
∣∣∣ , ∀i (9)
where
∂2Li
∂β2i
=(1−wi)∂
2Qdi
∂βi
2 +wi
∂2Qsi
∂βi
2 +
∂2ξi(β
d
i R
d
i−µ
d
i )
∂β2i
(10)
and
∂2Li
∂βi∂βj
= wiq
η
∞∫
0
e
−
γ(βi+βj)
η
−C(γ,q)
1+γ
(
(βi+βj)γ
η
−2
)
γdγ. (11)
One can see that the second term in the right-hand side
of equation (10) is negative and equal to right-hand side of
equation (11). The first and third terms in the right-hand side
of equation (10) are negative too thus, inequality (9) holds.
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